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Premise
Let’s be honest: we don’t know exactly how Google works. However, we all use Google 
to get information, probably because everybody else does. And although available 
data is quite ambiguous and inconsistent, everybody means almost literally everybody: 
at the beginning of this decade, 65 percent of daily online searches in the United States 
were made through Google,1 while in Italy the percentage of people who declared us-
ing Google had grown to 92 percent.2 To be more precise, though, some local markets 
show significant differences: Google’s algorithm is mostly supposed to be suitable for 
the Latin alphabet, and in all likelihood this is why some geo-cultural systems such 
as Russia or China are resistant to its hegemony.3 In any case, generally speaking, 
Google’s growing influence is exactly the first problem we have to face: in the last 15 
years, the ‘big G’ has become the most powerful company in the history of cultural in-
dustries, and here it will be considered as such. A very simple fact, which nonetheless 
raises a radical question: how could such a monopoly emerge from the decentralized 
project of the World Wide Web?
And to be honest, I do use Google, but I am worried about the way it is shaping our 
culture. The interesting problem to tackle is that Google’s power is not about censor-
ship. Such cases as the well-discussed deal between Google and the Chinese govern-
ment or Google’s likely adherence to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act are indeed 
borderline cases; they are very telling but at the same time quite easy to detect. On the 
contrary, the main problem is ultimately Google’s ordinary strategies: the ‘Big Firewall’ 
working daily behind the scenes, the biased representation of reality proposed by an 
agency that pretends to be neutral even though it obviously is not. For this same rea-
son, a critical analysis of Google’s power is seriously limited by two opposing things: 
one, the object to be analyzed also belongs to our daily experience, as often happens 
in social sciences, and two, we then have to take into account a device whose techni-
cal rules we hardly understand, as is common in the narrower field of platform studies 
or software studies. The two problems become one effect: the current paradigm in the 
organization of culture, which is universally affecting everyday practices, ultimately 
relies on a technological secret (to some extent, we could even consider Google’s 
algorithm as the digital version of the Coca-Cola recipe: everybody likes it, while no-
1.  Data available at www.comscore.com. 
2.  Data available at www.fullplan.it.
3.  Siva Vaidhyanathan, The Googlization of Everything (And Why We Should Worry), Berkeley and 
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2011, p. 144.
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body knows why or how it is actually made). Furthermore, awareness of this problem is 
nearly non-existent because of the perception of Google as a neutral and user-friendly 
(or even friendly) interface, and even as a beautiful, free of charge tool, likely to enable 
people to look for almost everything they want. But what is the secret of Google’s suc-
cess, information for information’s sake, or something more complicated?
the Kingdom of (apparent) neutrality
Apparent neutrality: this could be a good definition for this search engine’s industrial 
strategies. In other words, Google’s lack of neutrality does not raise any problems; 
mass media and cultural agencies are never neutral, nor even expected to be. The 
problem with Google is that it is perceived as a neutral tool, rather than as an active 
gatekeeping function, while search engines, as Karine Barzilai-Nahon points out, play 
exactly the same part as human gatekeepers in traditional media.4 Nonetheless, while 
the role of traditional gatekeepers has been gradually brought to light, many surveys 
show how search engines are contrarily considered to be very reliable information 
sources. As for Google, we might wonder, to what extent is its white interface pass-
ing off as a neutral tool even though of course it is not? We could say that the stylistic 
choice of a plain white interface puts accent on neutrality, despite the information 
reduction and hierarchization through its algorithms. Google’s maybe not hiding all its 
filtering operations, but in a sense provides the user with the ‘promise of objectivity’, 
as Gillespie recently put it.5 It is no accident that the search result page – designed to 
be visibly free from any imposed frame – is visually very different from Google News, 
which on the contrary shows a very crowded page, full of information, images, and so 
forth.6 According to a Pew survey, 68 percent of users consider search engines as an 
‘unbiased source of information’, and 62 percent of them are not capable of distin-
guishing between ‘paid and unpaid results’: for some reasons, people simply tend to 
‘trust search engines’7 while no longer trusting traditional news media, and this attitude 
is arguably destined to give Google particular strength.
Does the problem ultimately rely on the software, or the people using it? According 
to the surveys focused on search engines, the web user – far from being engaged, as 
she is too often supposed to be – assumes a very lazy attitude. Most users, for ex-
ample, only type a one-word query,8 and very rarely combine more than three words,9 
in this way reducing complexity and limiting themselves to the minimum cognitive ef-
4.  Karine Barzilai-Nahon, ‘Toward a Theory of Network Gatekeeping: A Framework for Exploring 
Information Control’, Journal of the American Society for Information, Science and Technology 
59.9 (2008): 1493-1512.
5.  Tarleton Gillespie, ‘The Relevance of Algorithms’, in Tarleton Gillespie, Pablo Boczkowski,  
and Kirsten Foot (eds) Media Technologies, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, forthcoming.
6.  See David Vise and Mark Malseed, The Google Story, New York: Random House, 2005.
7.  Deborah Fallows, ‘Search Engine Users. Internet Users are Confident, Satisfied and Trusting  
– but They Are Also Unaware and Naïve’, Pew Internet & American Life Project, 2005, p 15.
8.  Bernard Jansen and Amanda Spink, ‘How We Are Searching the World Wide Web? A Comparison 
of Nine Search Engine Transaction Logs’, Information Processing and Management 42 (2006): 
252-256; see also Peiling Wang, Michael Berry, and Yiheng Yang, ‘Mining Longitudinal Web 
Queries: Trends and Patterns’, Journal of the American Society for Information Science and 
Technology 54.8 (2003): 743-758.
9.  Bernard Jansen, Amanda Spink, and Tefko Saracevic, ‘Real Life, Real Users, and Real Needs:  
A Study and Analysis of User Queries on the Web’, Information Processing and Management  
36.3 (2000): 216.
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fort. Confirming other studies, Jansen, Spink, and Pedersen showed that most people 
usually dedicate no more than five minutes to a web search and, in so doing, tend to 
select nothing but the most common tools.10 In other words, if search engines are, as 
stated years ago by Paul di Maggio et al., ‘biased in their identification and, especially, 
ranking of sites, the effects of this bias are compounded by the tendency of engine 
users to employ simple search terms and to satisfice by terminating searches at the 
first acceptable site’.11
Further, surveys show a more relevant tendency dealing with the way people normally 
receive and filter information. Between 60 and 80 percent of users read only the first 
ten results proposed by the search engine, and data vary marginally between surveys, 
making their general meaning clear. Those surveys are focused on the general use 
of search engines rather than on Google as a specific service, however they tell us 
something very important: people choose between the first five or ten links selected by 
the algorithm, which are, according to the original project, the most linked rather than 
the most reliable. Consider Larry Page and Sergey Brin’s 1998 presentation of Google:
Academic citation literature has been applied to the web, largely by counting cita-
tions or backlinks to a given page. This gives some approximation of a page’s im-
portance or quality. PageRank extends the idea by not counting links from all pages 
equally, and by normalizing by the number of links on a page.
And the following ‘justification’ is that,
Intuitively, pages that are well cited from many places around the web are worth 
looking at. If a page was not high quality, […] it is quite likely that Yahoo’s homepage 
would not link to it. PageRank handles both these cases and everything in between 
by recursively propagating weights through the link structure of the web.12
Some approximation, intuitively, quite likely: PageRank can possibly work as an indi-
cator of quality – possibly, but this is not its main goal. PageRank’s quantitative bias 
is not a well-kept secret; this is generally the way Google works, and there is nothing 
bad in quantitative methodology as such. The problem is not that Google arbitrarily 
selects information, in this way establishing a cultural (and hence political) hierarchy. 
The problem is that this ranking is not perceived as arbitrary as it is, and has recently 
become a kind of universal and well-established hierarchy. The most striking aspect of 
the problem is that users only read the first results page,13 therefore basically validating 
without question the hierarchy arbitrarily established by the algorithm. Consequently, 
PageRank is ‘recursively propagating’ its bias and leading people to conform to what 
10.  Bernard Jansen, Amanda Spink, and Jan Pedersen, ‘A Temporal Comparison of AltaVista Web 
Searching’, Journal of the American Society for Information, Science and Technology 56.6 (2005): 
564.
11.  Paul Di Maggio, Eszter Hargittai, W. Russell Neuman, and John P. Robinson, ‘Social Implications 
of the Internet’, Annual Review of Sociology 27 (2001): 314.
12.  Sergey Brin and Larry Page, ‘The Anatomy of a Large-Scale Hypertextual Web Search Engine’, 
Seventh International World Wide Conference, Brisbane, 1998, http://ilpubs.stanforde.
edu:8090/361/. 
13.  See Craig Silverstein, Monica Henzinger, Hannes Marais, and Michael Moricz, ‘Analysis of a Very 
Large AltaVista Query Log’, Newsletter ACM SIGIR Forum 33.1 (1999): 6-12.
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all the others are reading and (arguably) to take this as a given. As for the exact per-
centage of people who only read the first results page, data are not entirely consistent 
but are enough to allow some confidence in the findings: 70 percent in a 1999 study,14 
58 percent in a 2000 survey focused on Excite,15 73 percent in a 2002 survey dedicated 
to nine different search engines,16 more than 72 percent in a 2005 research on AltaVis-
ta.17 Though clearly data vary, they account for the large majority of web users. If we 
look at more recent surveys, we can find some partial confirmations of previous ten-
dencies. According to Jansen and Spink, web users are ‘unwilling to invest additional 
effort to locate’ relevant contents, and still show a ‘low tolerance of viewing any results 
past the first page’.18 Statistical data released by Bing in 2013 show that 50 percent 
of users simply click the top result, while only ‘4-6 percent click the third result’.19 On 
the other hand, Keane, O’Brien and Smyth provided an empirical test by simulating 
a Google interface able to reverse the order of results, thus showing how people’s 
search is ‘partially biased’, even though users are sometimes able to detect the most 
relevant page even at the bottom of the list.20 In other words, the degree to which the 
use of search engines is biased is still to be proved. The bias, however, exists, since 
users are barely aware of the way algorithms filter data and direct operations.
Unfortunately, the most part of available data reported in this article are too old to 
provide a clear understanding of the current use of search engines; however, they can 
help us raise some questions. What do they suggest? Simply and sadly, that often 
people do not see any reason to challenge search engines, or question their reliability 
and transparency. If we consider that people now limit their consumption to one search 
engine, the problem suddenly becomes evident.
google as Social Pattern
I said earlier that people use only Google and so do I, but is this happening by accident 
or design? The reason why everybody uses Google could actually be simple: Google 
provides the most reliable results. We may however wonder to what extent such a uni-
versal usage ultimately depends on a clear understanding of technical performances – 
which should be based on a systematic comparison between different search engines 
– or rather on the pressure of current cultural frames. In this respect, we may wonder 
whether Google has been achieving dominance over its competitors through a two-
step process. At a first level, quality arguably played a part: Google is considered to 
provide more complete and spam-free results than its competitors, and people prefer it 
over other search engines because of its accuracy and overall quality.21 What is more, 
the fact that Google is set as a default home page in some popular browsers has prob-
ably contributed to its universal adoption, or at it least to the consolidation of its lead-
14.  Amanda Spink and Bernard Jansen, ‘A Study of Web Search Trends’, Webology 1 (2004),  
www.webology.ir.
15.  Jansen, Spink, and Saracevic, ‘Real Life, Real Users, and Real Needs’, p. 215.
16.  Jansen and Spink, ‘How We Are Searching the World Wide Web?’, pp. 257-258.
17.  Jansen, Spink, and Pedersen, ‘A Temporal Comparison of AltaVista Web Searching’, p. 563.
18.  Jansen and Spink, ‘How Are We Searching the World Wide Web?’ p. 260.
19.  Data available at http://www.bing.com/blogs/site_blogs/b/searchquality/archive/2013/04/24/ten-
blue-links-no-more-dynamic-page-sizing.aspx.
20.  Mark Keane, Maeve O’ Brien, and Barry Smyth, ‘Are People Biased in Their Use of Search 
Engines?’ Communications of the ACM 51.2 (2008): 49-52.
21.  Fellows, Search Engine Users, p. 14.
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ership. For these reasons, it is actually difficult to distinguish between technical and 
social factors when it comes to analyzing their consequences on daily life practices. A 
social pattern, wrote Pierre Bourdieu, is basically a form of ‘habitus’: 
a system of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed 
to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles of the generation and 
structuring of practices […] which can be adapted to their goals without presuppos-
ing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary 
to attain them […].22
Could things have gone differently? Obviously yes, but this is how social habitus works: 
as a piece of ‘history turned into nature’, explains Bourdieu, by which the class structure 
governs real practices through the mediation of a cultural scheme, able to engender ‘all 
the thoughts, all the conditions, all the actions consistent with those conditions, and 
no others’. As a consequence, people are forced to make a virtue out of necessity, ‘at 
the cost of double negation’, that is, ‘to refuse what is anyway refused and to love the 
inevitable’.23 Was Google necessary? I do not know. Could people even imagine a Goog-
le-free life? Arguably no, or at least I don’t think so. Double negation, in Bourdieu’s ex-
planation, means that you cannot desire something different from what the system wants 
you to desire, and now you cannot perceive as real something which is not included in 
Google. It seems that search engines eventually pass the test of an ontological proof.
In the end, the main difference between traditional and algorithm-driven media is this: 
all traditional media are each obviously biased, and this is arguably why audiences no 
longer trust them. As Manuel Castells pointed out, all recent international polls have 
been showing a very similar trend, according to which people barely believe in politi-
cal parties, newspapers, and broadcasting media, all reported to be part of the same 
influential lobby. According to Castells, this dissatisfaction with traditional media is a first 
step toward discovering ‘mass self communication’: people have to get rid of TV, so as 
to explore the new possibilities opened up by the web.24 But this time Castells is simply 
wrong, in my opinion. People do not believe in TV anymore, but they do trust Google, and 
his almost naïve distinction between ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ media does not provide a 
serious understanding of power as it is now taking place within the new digital platforms. 
the bubble will have You
PageRank is simply the first stage in Google’s strategy. The second is characterized by 
the customization strategies through the use of cookies, most likely launched in 2007 
after the acquisition of digital marketing company DoubleClick. The reasons behind this 
new strategy are difficult to discern: arguably, the limits of the traditional business mod-
el, which were only based on advertising revenues, played a part. In fact, for some time 
and especially before its stock went public, market conditions allowed Google to gather 
wealth by simply exploiting advertising links; however, a new problem arose when tech-
nological innovation finally promised web users the ability to skip the ad links.25
22.  Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977 
(1972), p. 78.
23.  Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, p. 77.
24.  Manuel Castells, Communication Power, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
25.  See Vise and Malseed, The Google Story.
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In this sense, the massive use of cookies can be intended as a more narrow strategy 
to occupy the market: according to Eli Pariser, cookies allow Google to ‘extrapolate 
what you like’, and shape the search results according to your individual traffic history. 
More importantly, Google is now ‘filtering out’ all the information that is not supposed 
to be relevant for the target. Better yet, it is filtering out the information that is not rel-
evant according to what the user has done in the past, in this way giving shape to an 
inherently static and conservative culture. The result of this customization practice is a 
‘bubble’, a kind of cage, in which individuals experience a particular version of reality, 
different from that perceived by others.26
To some extent, one could say, we have always been living in a ‘bubble’. Any mass 
medium – newspaper, television, etc. – provides a biased representation of reality, 
and thus in turn builds a kind of bubble, preventing its users from reading or watch-
ing all dissonant content. This is of course true, even though Google’s bubble is more 
dangerous, according to Eli Pariser, because it takes place at a very deep and hidden 
level, characterized by three main differences: it is narrow, invisible, and, what is more, 
almost impossible to avoid. ‘You are alone in the bubble’, he writes, it being built upon 
individual rather than collective preferences, and dedicated to a single consumption 
history rather than to a community, such as the audience of a TV channel. On the 
other hand, the new bubble is invisible: the framing operated by traditional media can 
be ambiguous, but at its first level you obviously know that you are accessing a given 
information environment, ruled by a given gatekeeper. Conversely, in the new bubble 
the user is no longer aware, for the cookies act at a very hidden level, such that you 
do not even know that cookies exist. For the very same reason, in the end the web 
user cannot decide to ‘enter the bubble’, as we do when choosing a magazine, radio 
station, or a movie. The bubble is choosing the user and surrounding his or her daily 
practices.27
Both PageRank and cookies reveal that Google does indeed filter information, in this 
way falsifying the ‘filter failure’ thesis suggested by David Weinberger28 (and, in differ-
ent words, by Clay Shirky29). According to Weinberger, the web is not properly affected 
by a serious overload, but rather a weakening of filters. It is this weakness of filters – 
which no longer filter out, according to his optimistic idea – that is simply showing the 
long forgotten state of our culture, that is, a disproportion between individual compre-
hension, on the one hand, and knowledge as a whole, on the other. Things are too big 
to know, Weinberger suggests, and the web simply reveals this well-kept secret; but 
in any case the idea that the new platforms simply filter forward and do not filter out is 
hardly suitable for the way algorithm works, and it is entirely wrong if we consider the 
deep effects of customization practices. 
After PageRank and cookies, the next level is constituted, not by accident, by a kind 
of hybrid form likely to implement social network functions (Google+) in the search 
engine system. From the web at large to the personal network: this narrowing of cul-
26.  Eli Pariser, The Filter Bubble. What the Internet is Hiding from You, New York: Penguin, 2011.
27.  Pariser, The Filter Bubble, pp. 9-10.
28.  David Weinberger, Too Big to Know, New York: Basic Books, 2011.
29.  Clay Shirky, Cognitive Surplus. Creativity and Generosity in a Connected Age, New York:  
Penguin, 2010.
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tural horizons can come as a surprise, but it is hardly unexpected if we consider that 
Google does not trade information, as it claims it does, but something very different. In 
a complex cultural system, as Tiziana Terranova recently noted, the true traded value 
is no longer information, but attention. While in fact the first is too widely available, the 
latter is under a scarcity regime, and is the ideal ‘condition that can give rise to a proper 
economy’.30 Therefore, ‘technology of attention’ is a good definition for what Google, 
along with other players, is now doing – gathering and trading people’s attention, and 
even reducing its information flow (to a great extent, attention for attention’s sake: the 
use of personal data is actually not as important as its control and storage). Or, as 
Rachael – Blade Runner’s most controversial replicant – famously said: I am not in the 
business; I am the business.
Page and Brin’s famous paper only describes the first stage in the evolution of 
Google, but we know that its functioning cannot be reduced to PageRank: its algo-
rithms are actually based ‘on more than 200 unique signals’, including ‘the fresh-
ness of content’ and the user’s region.31 In the last years, Google has released many 
new features, such as ‘social search’, designed to ‘understand not only content but 
also people’, and allow users to find information directly related to them;32 ‘knowl-
edge search’, which introduces some elements of the so-called ‘semantic web’;33 
and Google Now, a service expected to provide you with the right information ‘be-
fore you even ask’, through the implementation of geo-locative technologies.34 In 
short, Google combines many different services and tools, but I here consider only 
two of them – PageRank and the use of cookies – which seem to produce the most 
interesting effects. While the PageRank algorithm tends to favor the most linked 
pages, thus building a kind of homogenized agenda of knowledge and information, 
the use of cookies on the contrary leads to a very specific customization, likely to 
provide any user with a sort of individual ‘bubble’. So cookies oppose the tendency 
of PageRank, insofar as cookies model search results after the user’s individual 
tastes and preferences, which can be automatically detected. Google’s action is 
therefore splitting into two different and almost opposite tendencies: the maximum 
degrees of standardization and individualization, which becomes quite a challenge 
for social studies.
Dialectic of google
I’ve said the maximum degrees of standardization and individualization coexist in the 
same device. This seems to confirm Geert Lovink’s idea that in the stage of mass web 
diffusion there would no longer be a dominant tendency, whether we look for positive 
or negative effects of the internet.35 But there is something more here. What emerges is 
in fact a new technical version of the most traditional sociological problem, the tension 
between individual and structure, and the rise of a new order, regulating the relation-
ship between the two. 
30.  Tiziana Terranova, ‘Attention, Economy and the Brain’, Culture Machine 13 (2012): 2.
31.  See, http://www.google.com/intl/en/insidesearch/howsearchworks/algorithms.html.
32.  See, http://googleblog.blogspot.it/2012/01/search-plus-your-world.html.
33.  See, http://www.google.com/insidesearch/features/search/knowledge.html.
34.  See, http://www.google.com/landing/now/.
35.  Geert Lovink, Zero Comments: Blogging and Critical Internet Theory, New York: Routledge, 2007.
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The role played by media and cultural industries in maintaining this balance has been 
widely investigated. In particular, Adorno and Horkheimer made a critical analysis in 
their Dialectic of Enlightenment:
The sociological theory that the loss of the support of objectively established reli-
gion, the dissolution of the last remnants of precapitalism, together with technologi-
cal and social differentiation or specialization, have led to cultural chaos is disproved 
every day; for culture now impresses the same stamp on everything.36
Even 70 years after Adorno and Horkheimer’s masterwork, this point remains: the idea 
according to which the evolution of our societies will eventually destroy all solid struc-
tures and lead to a kind of cultural chaos is simply ‘disproved’ by fact. According to 
Adorno, capitalist culture is stable (the ‘rhythm of the iron system’) rather than fluid, 
or, as we would say in present terms, post-modern or liquid. As Franco Moretti re-
cently pointed out, Western bourgeoisie has actually been historically functioning as 
a conservative force, so as to normalize social turbulence, and build up a predictable 
pattern of everyday life – and ‘all that was solid’ eventually ‘became more so’.37 At the 
same historical end, it seems that Google is stressing this tendency to its limits, ‘now 
impressing the same stamp on everything’ – everything: news and general contents, 
books and geographical maps, social circles and e-mail services, and so on. Two op-
posite and dynamic tendencies that nonetheless cooperate to produce a static result: 
the ‘inherently conservative’ nature of Google’s cultural processes by which, as dis-
cussed by Eli Pariser and Siva Vaidhyanathan, anyone will basically find what he or 
she is inclined to look for, and will eventually know what he or she already knows. The 
bubble, in this sense, is the ultimate technical version of a long-term process by which 
the individual has become a predictable part of a predictable statistical pattern:
Everybody must behave (as if spontaneously) in accordance with his determined 
and indexed level, and choose the category of mass product turned out for his type. 
Consumers appear as statistics on research organization charts […]. The technique 
is that used for any type of propaganda.38
Therefore, the individual bubble, the homogeneous global agenda, and the tension be-
tween the two factors can be regarded, to a considerable extent, as a tension of oppo-
sites. But do we really need such a complicated explanation as a dialectic of Google? 
More consideration needs to be given to three aspects of Google’s hegemony: the 
search algorithm, the contradiction between PageRank and the customization strate-
gies, and finally the dynamic evolution of both tools.
PageRank obviously relies on quantity: the more links you have, the higher you will rank 
according to the algorithm’s hierarchies. We know what logically follows is the power 
law nature of the web: links, as almost any other resource, tend to cluster around 
a handful of sites, following the ‘80/20 rule’ of the Pareto principle.39 In this sense, 
36.  Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, London: Verso, 1997 (1944),  
p. 120.
37.  Franco Moretti, The Bourgeois Between History and Literature, London: Verso, 2013, p. 15.
38.  Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 123.
39.  Albert-Laszlo Barabási, Linked: The New Science of Networks, New York: Perseus, 2002.
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Page Rank is neither establishing nor questioning a ranking, while the algorithm simply 
reproduces a previous hierarchy. This is why, following Vaidhyanathan, Google’s power 
has less to do with cultural than ‘infrastructural’ imperialism – the production of ideo-
logical content, or public opinion shaping, versus the control of the communication 
process as such.40 However, during this process, something is happening: quantity is 
definitely turning into quality, and for the very same reason – content does not matter, 
only links do. This tendency can be labeled simply as ‘the transformation of quantity 
into quality and vice versa’.
We’ve seen that this standardization tendency is counter-balanced by a different pro-
cess, enabled by the use of cookies: a very narrow customization strategy, likely to 
build up a bubble around any individual profile. But the point I am most interested in is 
that Google’s inner process is not exhausted by either tendency, but is made of both, 
however contradictory they may be. Search results are organized according to the 
individual footprints detected by cookies, but ultimately rely on the same, common, 
sterilized cultural universe. Two opposite forces in the very same device – in other 
words, a kind of ‘interpenetration of opposites’.
However, this is not a static contradiction but a mobile tension, wherein any innovation 
is not just an advancement of a previous technology, but its overcoming through the 
exploration of a new evolutionary path. The PageRank algorithm, for example, is said 
to make the world too homogenous, with cookies now providing the opposite effect. 
Though Google can be blamed for destroying the copyright system and even the hu-
manistic heritage as a whole, Google Books will eventually save it. We must still keep 
in mind all the polemics of the ‘virtual’ world and its likely effects on the representa-
tion of reality, as when Google Maps suddenly provides a hybrid representation of the 
planet, half ‘real’ and half ‘virtual’. Any process is a negation of the previous one, lead-
ing the system to a temporary equilibrium, destined in turn to give new transformation 
a place. Perhaps we could define this phenomenon with Hegel’s words: the ‘negation 
of negation’.
I will stop here, as I have attempted, in a half serious way, to apply Friedrich Engels’ 
laws of dialectics to Google’s cultural system.41 Serious, because I think that current 
technological innovation does require a strong theoretical investigation rather than a 
merely quantitative analysis usually operated through crawlers (which, in a sort of vi-
cious circle, provide a further legitimation of commercial software as the only valuable 
cultural platform, and so on). Half not serious, because I am not actually sure that the 
traditional forms of thought – such as Engels’ dialectics, or Bourdieu’s view of social 
practice – are the most suitable ones for the current needs of critical theory.
Absolutely, though, the two forces acting behind Google reproduce the basic tension 
between individualization and standardization that any social system is made of, while, 
at the same time, they move it to a next evolutionary level. What kind of sovereignty are 
we talking about with the homogenization of global knowledge and the ‘micro-physi-
cal’ customization of digital marketing? Put in different terms: cookies collect data in a 
40.  Vaidhyanathan, The Googlization of Everything, pp. 110-114.
41.  See Friedrich Engels, Dialectics of Nature, Minneapolis and St. Paul: Wellred, 2012 (1883).
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cultural ecosystem where, for good or for bad, such things as violence, pornography, 
multiple names, anonymity (in a word, dissonance) have been banned. In this context, 
the individual is a consumer, tracked with any move he or she makes, and living in a 
digital market where there is no room for conflict. What a powerful device, and what an 
ideal habitus for the world order of late capitalism.
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